IS THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH RELEVANT?
For centuries, the Hippocratic oath, or some pledge derived from it, has guided physicians to " rst, do no harm" (3) . is pivotal instruction, which new physicians publicly pledge to uphold before beginning professional lives devoted to the care of the sick, conveys a responsibility to avoid intentionally harming patients in the quest to heal. Prior to the publication in the early 1900s of the Flexner Report-a treatise that serves as the basis for the modern practice of medicine-(4) and the ensuing movement toward a scienti c (evidence-based) approach to the practice of medicine, this fundamental obligation was not just philosophical; it was essential to protect patients from some of medicine's popular "cures, " such as bloodletting for fever (5) . In an age of magic, such a pledge likely referred to an abhorrence of pagan ritual and the need to embrace therapies with sound mechanistic basis or empiric support. One wonders, however, whether the oath was meant to imply that complete safety should transcend all other features of a possible cure.
In the era of science-guided therapeutic development, is it realistic to state (or even believe) that one cannot do harm in the quest to discover new drugs, biologics, or devices and de ne their optimal use? e concepts of respect for the autonomy of patients in decision-making, bene cence (doing what best serves the patient), justice (fair distribution of medical care), and informed consent are all critical constructs in medical research ethics. However, in an age when even the most deadly of cancers can sometimes be cured with highly potent, yet potentially deadly chemotherapeutic agents, it is perhaps time to rewrite the Oath of Hippocrates to state: "on average, try to do more good than harm" (6, 7).
Our aim as innovators is not and should not be to diminish the essential requirement to protect patients' safety but rather to acknowledge that all treatments (both those being developed and those currently being used in clinical care) carry some degree of both risk and bene t. e obligation of clinical investigation is to provide high-quality scienti c evidence that permits quantitative assessment of these opposing parameters. With this information, patients and their families, clinicians, and patient advocates can make informed choices among various therapeutic options.
A RISK BENEFIT BALANCING ACT
As a case study of risk-bene t analysis, let us consider Type 2 diabetes mellitus. Controlling blood sugar in patients with diabetes is a laudable therapeutic goal. Studies have proven that control of serum glucose concentrations is associated with health bene ts-for example, lowering the risk of microvascular diseases such as diabetic retinopathy (8) . Although the optimal level of glucose control is a matter of some debate (9) , there is little argument that diabetes is best treated through a combination of dietary manipulation, life-style changes, and drug therapies. A number of agents that control blood glucose have been developed, and several recently discovered ones such as the glitazones target speci c biological pathways. Regulatory approval of such drugs has largely depended on their ability to demonstrate, in clinical trials, a favorable e ect on controlling serum glucose concentrations.
e global obesity and diabetes epidemics are coupled with (and complicated by) a growing public demand for new e ective diabetes medications. Partly in response to these pressures, FDA has issued a Dra Guidance document that outlines a development path for new diabetes agents that recognizes the desire for innovative therapies while acknowledging that many of the newer agents are associated with an increased risk of cardiac ischemic events. e document sets out quantitative guidance for the level of cardiac risk that must be excluded as a precondition for approval of new agents (10) . As an example of what is now required, the dra guidance language from FDA states, "If the premarketing application contains clinical data that show that the upper bound of the two-sided 95 percent condence interval for the estimated increased risk (that is, the risk ratio) is between 1.3 and 1.8, and the overall risk-bene t analy-" " sis supports approval, a postmarketing trial generally will be necessary to show de nitively that the upper bound of the two-sided 95 percent con dence interval for the estimated risk ratio is less than 1.3. is can be achieved by conducting a single trial that is adequately powered or by combining the results from a premarketing safety trial with a similarly designed postmarketing safety trial. " e construct accepted in this Guidance re ects the fact that these e ective drugs have both bene ts and risks.
INNOVATION STALLED

Drugs and biologicals.
e regulatory approach described above, which uses clear risk-bene t parameters in guidance documents developed by the FDA, unfortunately has not been widely applied to all areas of therapeutics.
e result of this omission is that the product approval process has become very slow, unpredictable, and extremely costly (11) . In a recent article published in e Boston Globe (12), Robert K. Couglin, President of the Massachusetts Biotechnology Council, verbalized the vexing problem on the minds of scientists and investors alike: "If it takes a total of 12 years and over a billion dollars to get a drug from the bench to the bedside, it takes too long and it's too costly. " In that same article, Senator Scott Brown of Massachusetts accused the FDA of "crushing innovation" and "throwing a wet blanket" on drug and biologics discovery and development in the United States by delaying decisions on new therapies, changing the requirements during the approval process, and being unresponsive to the needs of companies that discover and seek to sell life-saving technologies therapeutics (12) . James C. Greenwood, President of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, added, " e FDA understands that if they approve a product that's not safe or e ective, that's a failure, and we agree with that. But it's not deemed a failure if people die because [the FDA] took too long to approve a product" (12) .
In another recent article at Forbes.com, Henry Miller, founder and former Director of FDA's O ce of Biotechnology, agrees: " e FDA has become so risk-adverse and antagonistic to new drugs and to their developers that companies are moving their testing and manufacturing abroad. Approvals have shrunk to a trickle, and fewer new medicines are available to our aging population" (13) . Together, these observations suggest that one bottleneck to pharmaceutical innovation is a regulatory process gone awry-an impediment that can be relieved by reassessment of FDA's role in terms of risk-bene t analysis and clear, consistent requirements for therapeutics approval.
Devices. FDA has traditionally separated the regulatory approval pathways for medical devices from those for pharmaceutical and biological therapeutics. e logic behind this division is that the undesired side e ects and complications associated with a purely mechanical device typically manifest at the site of device implantation and can be identi ed fairly easily; furthermore, devices o en can be removed if necessary. In contrast, the systemic nature of pharmaceuticals delivery means that these agents have the potential to cause unwanted e ects at remote locations in the body (such as teratogenesis or carcinogenesis) that are di cult to identify in short clinical trial periods or small subject populations. Hence, FDA approval of devices has typically occurred on a faster time scale (ranging from several months to 1 to 2 years) than that of pharmaceuticals, which can take 8 to 10 years (14, 15) . Furthermore, the criteria for approval of drugs and biologics are safety, e cacy, and quality. (To be of su cient quality, drugs and biologics must be made reproducibly and with appropriate purity and potency according to good manufacturing practices.) Devices, however, must only be shown to be "relatively safe. " In an excerpt from the guidance document for device regulation, the FDA states, "Adequate data from in vitro and animal testing, demonstrating that the device is relatively safe and that it functions as intended, must be submitted before approval for clinical studies in humans will be granted" (16) .
In fact, with the use of a process known as a 510(k) approval (17) FDA has traditionally provided even faster reviews with less-stringent clinical-data requirements for devices that are substantially similar to predicate devices that have been previously approved by the FDA. Novel devices to be used for new medical indications or those that hold the potential for causing major untoward complications have traditionally gone through the standard Premarket Approval Process (PMA) for devices. e PMA for devices requires relatively small, randomized, controlled clinical trials powered to detect major adverse events and assess efc a c y ( 16) . e main goal of the PMA, however, is to ensure that devices are not overtly harmful to the patients compared with the bene ts the technology provides. Over the last 30 years, these requirements were considered to be appropriate by both physicians and members of the medical technology industry. No one wanted to see dangerous or unreliable devices unleashed on the public; yet, Americans insisted on having access to the latest technology that could potentially cure their illnesses (18) .
is process worked extremely well in the past. Ford et 
.6% of all devices approved by FDA through either the 510(k) or the PMA route yielded products that remained on the market; in other words, FDA issued almost no Class I recalls-those invoked for products suspected of causing serious adverse health consequences or death (20) . During this era, innovation in medical devices ourished in the United States, making this country the undisputed world leader in medical technology.
In recent years, rather than adhering to the "relatively safe" standard, FDA has become increasingly inclined to treat devices as if they were pharmaceuticals while at the same time expanding still further the regulatory requirements needed for the approval of small-molecule drugs and biologics (16) . Indeed, as regulators continued not to explicitly de ne "relative, " the loose and perhaps more common translation of relative safety is "absolute absence of toxicity. " is aversion on the part of FDA to any degree of untoward complications stemming from the use of an approved product has had a crippling e ect on medical innovation. ere may be a variety of reasons for the current conservative trend and delays in the approval process, including poor management, personnel and expertise shortages, and an increase in the complexity of therapeutic approaches. But one immediately addressable bottleneck is the excessive fear that the regulatory approval processes will be perceived as lax and failing in its mandate to protect the public.
Very recently, the FDA announced the results of a controversial study that the agency had commissioned from the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which seemed to highlight these fears (21, 22) . Among other recommendations, the IOM commission recommended that the 510(k) clearance process, in place since 1976 for medical devices, should be entirely abandoned and proposed that each new low and medium risk device would need to be evaluated "de novo" with a new clinical trial (both pre and post approval) despite a precedent of predicate devices that showed no untoward clinical outcomes from essentially similar previously approved products.
is would, in e ect, likely cause all medical devices to undergo the much more rigorous, expensive, and time-consuming steps currently required for a PMA approval.
Among the many critics of this study was the Washington Legal Foundation, a probusiness group, who led a petition with the FDA arguing that the agency was statutorily barred from adopting any of the report's recommendations because of what it claimed was the panel's bias. e legal foundation argued that the Institute of Medicine had failed to balance the panel by including ofcials from the device industry, investment community, or patients who had bene ted from devices (21) .
e IOM recommendations also resulted in an immediate reaction from both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill (23) . Senator Al Franken (D) said, "Calling for the elimination of the 510(k) process could be very harmful to innovation. e report's recommendations would impose new burdens on the medical device industry, without a clear path to a more e ective process. " Senator Amy Klobuchar (D) added, "Scrapping the 510(k) process entirely isn't what our businesses want and could limit access to life-saving products" (23) . U.S. representative Erik Paulsen (R), cochair of the house Medical Technology Caucus, remarked, " e 510 K review process has long been regarded as a safe and e ective way to bring much-needed life-saving products to the market. Eliminating it, as the IOM suggests, would … give Europe another leg up in competing for these madein-America technologies. What the medical devices manufacturers need is consistency in the approval process, not more uncertainty. Instead of replacing 510(k), I intend to work with innovators, physicians, and other stakeholders to streamline the device clearance process at the FDA. "
In the European Union (EU), devices are approved through a process referred to as CE Mark ("Conformité Européenne") approval. No more untoward results have been reported for devices approved for commercial release in the EU relative to those approved by FDA. In recent years, however, using CE Mark approval as a benchmark, FDA has become progressively risk adverse, resulting in protracted delays and extreme, o en prohibitive, costs to gain approval for commercialization in the United States. is trend has severely delayed and in some cases completely blocked potentially life-saving devices (for example, percutaneous aortic valves) from reaching the American public (18) .
Two recent articles reported results of a survey of more than 200 medical technology companies with recent experience in attempting to gain regulatory approval in both the EU and the United States (24, 25).
ese companies represent approximately 20% of all U.S. public and venture-backed medical device manufacturers. Eighty-ve percent of survey respondents found the EU authorities to be highly or mostly transparent, whereas only 27% of respondents rated the FDA in this category; similarly, 85% found the EU highly or mostly predictable versus only 22% for the FDA. e quality of being highly or mostly reasonable was characteristic of the EU according to 91% of respondents versus 25% for the FDA. e time required for approval of the respondents' low-risk devices in the EU was on average ~2 years shorter than that required in the United States; for higher-risk devices, the di erence was 3.5 years. Some delays at FDA can be blamed on lack of appropriate management. As an example, one-third of respondents reported that crucial FDA sta members or physician advisors missed key meetings with the company, and almost half of respondents experienced untimely changes in key FDA personnel, including lead reviewers of a project or branch chiefs responsible for evaluating a product.
Although this study has limitations-including a potential bias based on who chose to respond to the survey-it represents the most direct comparison of the current regulatory climates experienced by a large number of U.S. device manufacturers. e survey's data and analyses-veri ed independently by PricewaterhouseCooperssuggest one impetus for a disturbing current trend: Medical technology companies, entrepreneurs, and physician-innovators, who together over the past three decades made the United States the undisputed world Fig. 1 . Live strong. The thoughtful and industrious little pig-of Three Little Pigs fame-had nothing to fear; he weighed the risks and benefi ts of building a house of bricks and fared better against the wolf than did his neighbors who built their homes of weaker raw materials. Similarly, a strong FDA can properly assess the risks and benefi ts to the public of new medical products and off er consistent direction to scientists, leading to faster, rather than slower, robust regulatory decisions. " " leader in innovation, are now abandoning the American market and its patients in favor of the much more reasonable regulatory approval processes overseas (12, 13) .
Robust regulation. A strong FDA with su cient resources and expertise can properly assess the risks and bene ts to the public of new medical products and can provide clear and consistent direction to innovative companies, leading to robust regulatory decisions dispensed in a reasonable timeframe (Fig. 1) . e role of FDA as the regulator of health care products is to ensure that they are e ective and safe. It ought to be FDA's obligation to rigorously assess the balance between "e ective" and "safe, " preferably by requiring clinical trials that measure and aggregate meaningful clinical endpoints so that the data can be clearly understood by providers who are considering use of the products in their patients.
ENGAGING THE PUBLIC
It is clear that Americans value having choices and options, including in decisions related to their medical care. Given the complexity of the scienti c issues that support diagnostic and therapeutic interventions coupled with the vulnerabilities associated with illness, the health care system can never be completely market-driven. Still, health care providers and the public deserve the opportunity to engage in fact-based discussions around health care choices. ose at the health care-consumer table should assess the scienti c evidence in the context of their own state of health and lifestyle choices while also considering society's obligation to pay for health care.
A major challenge to this scenario is the relative lack of sophistication among the American people in understanding even basic quantitative concepts such as probability, estimates, and con dence intervals. Politicians, the public, and the medical community all need education in the area of statistical analysis in order to understand risk assessment and to manage expectations when it comes to medical products. e prevalence of lawsuits directed toward pharmaceutical and medical technology corporations whenever any untoward outcome occurs adds to the perception of the public that any sort of risk is never to be tolerated. Our politicians are also quick to stand before their constituents and loudly accuse biomedical companies of being irresponsible and FDA o cials of malfeasance if anything whatsoever goes wrong. All of these realities help to fuel the naïve public notion that life-saving drugs and devices must be no less than perfect agents that cure or prevent illness with no risk of side e ects. e truth is that we live in an imperfect world; if there is no risk, there is likely to be no bene t.
